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THE RECENT EXP ANSI ON
OF FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION:
Common Themes and Future Developments
John D. McCamus *
A lawyer learns of his client's marital problems and
consequently and successfully, pursues a romantic liaison with
the client's spouse.
A businessman enters into negotiations
with the owner of a parcel of land with a view to entering into
a joint venture to develop this property. The negotiations fail
and the businessman, who has correctly inferred that the
neighbouring property must be similarly valuable, acquires the
neighbouring property. A banker encourages and arranges for
loans to a customer to purchase shares of a target company
with a view to obtaining control, mistakenly unaware that
another department of the bank is assisting another shareholder
engaged in a similar exercise.
Prior to a reading of the recent case law on fiduciary
obligation,1 one wonders how many members of the profession
would have quickly concluded that the one thing these three
individuals had in common was that they had all engaged in a
breach of fiduciary duty. The recent and remarkable expansion
of fiduciary obligation was recently surveyed in a Law Society
of Upper Canada symposium, Fiduciary Duties - A Matter of
Trust (October 1986 - hereinafter "Symposium"). The present
paper was originally presented as an attempt to develop and
speculate upon themes common to the Symposium papers. The
papers provided accounts of the recent use of the fiduciary
concept in such contexts as real estate transactions, corporate
law, employment law, partnership and professional relationships.
One common theme that dearly emerged from the Symposium
papers is that the fiduciary concept is being asked to do a
great deal of work in a broad range of factual situations.
Indeed, the remarkable growth of fiduciary obligation in the law
reports has become one of the notable features of our
jurisprudence and has, as one would expect, inspired a
substantial law review literature and, indeed, two recent texts
devoted exclusively to this subject. 2
It may reasonably be asked, of course, whether the
fiduciary concept is one which can bear this workload without
sustaining a work-related injury of some sort. Although, as I
shall suggest below, the extension of the concept to new and
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intriguingly different fact situations should not be a cause for
alarm, there is some evidence in the case law that the concept
is drifting away from its moorings from time to time. As it is
my view that this latter development does bring with it the
risk of some confusion, I propose to draw attention to some
basic ideas concerning the fiduciary obligation and then, having
briefly explored the question of its extended application, offer a
few brief comments concerning remedial issues.

The Fiduciary Concept

In very general and perhaps misleadingly simple terms, it
may be said that the law of fiduciary obligations is a body of
equitable doctrine arising from Equity's concern with equitable
fraud. Breaches of duty thus lead to equitable remedies only
and, more particularly, to the constructive trust, and equitable
lien and the remedy of an accounting of profits. The first two
of these have a proprietary nature and, apart from the usual
advantages of propriet~ry remedies, c~rry with thei:i the
· advantage that the eqmtable rules relatmg to the tracmg of
property can be deployed by the plaintiff in identifying the
property in the hands of the defendant that is subject to the
remedial order.
Although I confess that my reading of the Symposium
papers has shaken my confidence to some extent, I persist in
the belief that the idea underlying fiduciary obligation is a
relatively straightforward one. In City of Toronto v. Bowes,
Chancellor Blake expressed the central point in the following
terms: 3
"The settled rule is, that he who is entrusted with the
business of others cannot be allowed to make such
business an object of interest to himself."
The law of fiduciary obligation is but one of the subjects of
the law of equity that have been brought together with the
common law of quasi-contract to form the modern law of
restitution. 4 Thus, it is argued by scholars of the law of
restitution that fiduciary obligation is one of the many areas of
common law and equity that may be properly characterized as
applications of the broad, underlying principle of the law of
restitution that one who has been unjustly enriched at the
expense of another is required to make restitution to the other.
Further, the law of fiduciary obligation is said to manifest
another broad, equitable principle which is also thought to be
an organizing theme of the law of restitution, that is that
wrongdoers shall not be permitted to profit from their
wrongdoing.
Breach of fiduciary obligation constitutes the
wrongdoing. The remedies of constructive trust and accounting
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of profits are available to remove pr_ofits made by the faithless
fiduciary.
The general framework of analysis in the fiduciar case
law also s~ms reasonably straightforward.
Laskin J., yas he
then" was, .m Can. Ae~o Service L_td. v. 0'Malley5 identified
~he four issues t.hat. arise for consideration in this area" as
irst? t~e det«;rmm!lt10n that the relationship between the
parties Is fiduciary m nature; second, the determination of the
natu~e o~ the .duty or duties that arise from the particular
delatwhnship; third, the determination of whether a particular
uty as ~eel?- . breachedi and fourth, the determination of the
ex_tent .of h!'1-b1hty resultmg from the breach in question
We
might imag~ne that Chancellor Blake would have added some
fle~h to this. usef!-11 .skeleton by suggesting that where there
bx1i:ts a relationship m which one party is entrusted with the
usmes~ of an?ther, the first party is under a duty not to
place his own mterest above that of the other and that where
~h~ firs.11 pbarty does so, any profit secured from breach of that
u Y w1
e recoverable by the second party.
As always, '?f ~ourse, the difficulty lies in applying these
broa._* ftneral prmc1ple~ to ~articular fact situations.
More
spec~ Ici Y' so~e co;11fus1on arises in the determination that a
part1~~ ar relat10nsh1p has a fiduciary character and in the
defi~1t10n of ~he ~cope of the duties appropriate to that
particular r.elat1onsh1~. Many, I fear, attempt to analyze these
Issuesffiby sm:~ply !18kmg whether the particular defendant holds
an o ice w~1ch is generall.Y recognized to be of a fiduciar
nature and_, if. so, by assummg that the fiduciary has essentially
all th~ o.bhl?at1ons of an express trustee. On both counts th.Y
analysis. is likely to lead to error. 6
'
Is
. With re~pect to the first issue, the identification of a
fiduciary relationship, it is traditional to begin, as Scott does in
the passage referred to by Crawford 7 by asking "Wh ·
fiduciary?"
and then by l1.st1"ng th e t yp1ca
. l fido
I~ a
h.
1 uc1ary
l t•
such
as
trustee-beneficiary,
principal-a ent
re a I?ns ips
guard1ar>;-ward,
executor-legatees,
solicitor-client,
direc~ors~
~hrp~raj~~p, alani so on. Parenthetically, we should observe that
e :a .1 ion
ist would not have included employees banks or
delio~u:tmg co-ventu~ers.
T~is ~hopping list approa~h to the
Aith1t1oh Sof fih~uc1ary obhgat1on may, however
mislead
o.ug . cott imself would commit no such erro; a listin ·
of this ku~d :nay ~ taken to suggest that fiduciary 'obli atio!
!'1-dheres prmc1pally, if not exclusively, to the holders of c~rtain
~hportahnt offices: Accor~ir>;gly, it may commonly be thought
at t e trick m pred1ctmg the extension of the fiduciar
c}:hcepth to new fact situations is to identify offices whic{
::1 oug
not Y.et considei:ed fiduciary, are of sufficient
Such an
importance to brmg them within the fiduciary net
approach may obscure from view and broad range· of possible
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applications of fiduciary doctrine.
that
8
Thus two of the Symposium papers suggest
although the concept of fiduciary obligation h~ now. be~n
extended to employees, it is likely to be restricte~ m its
application to senior managem~nt pers~nnel. . In this, these
authors are in good company. On this basis, however, we
might be tempted to assume, for examp).e, that . an . errand boy
would not be considered to have fiduciarY.1 obligations.
And
yet, in Re Coomber; Coombber v.. Coomber, Fletcher Moulton
L.J. offered the following o servation:

°

"Fiduciary relations are of many different types; the.y
extend from a relation of myself to an errand boy who is
bound to bring me back m.Y chan~e up to ~he m<?st
intimate and confidential relations which can P?ssibly exi~t
between one party and another where the one IS wholly m
the hands of the other because of his infinite trust in
him."
The errand boy illustration is perhaps far-fetched. The fi_rst
errand boy . who breaches his fiduciary obligation by purc~asmg
a winning lottery ticket with the change may well give ri.se to
earnest consideration of Re Coomber. In. any ev~nt, .the ).1st of
employees who may be subject to fiduciary obhgat1on IS n<?t
likely to be constrained to senior management employees, and .it
is therefore not surorising that one of the cases referred to m
the Roebuck paper!l relates to the activities of a hearing-aid
"
specialist at a department store.
The correct answer to the question "W?o is a fiduci8.!Y?.
is, then, "anyone". If anyone can .be a fiduciary, ho~ever, it is
also obvious that not everyone is, not all the time.
The
principal identifying characteristic of the fiduciary is that
referred to above the fiduciary is one who has undertaken to
act on behalf of :mother.12 More than this., there are a ~umb~r
of recurring features of fiduciary relationships. The fiduciary is
likely to either have stewardship of some . of the assets of t~e
person to whom the ~uty is o~ed or will ho~d. an office m
which there are umquely-available opportunities for se~f
interested activity or, the r~lationship is !ikely ~o be one m
which the fiduciary has cons1derabl~ authority or mfluence over
the individual to whom the duty is o~ed. In ~he c:bsen~e of
such factors, it is unlikely that a fiduciary. relationship will be
found but as it is difficult to be more precise about the nature
of fiduciary obligation than this, it is not surprising . th!lt the
list of applications of as broad and open-textured a prmciple as
this continues to grow in length.
.
.
Once one has identified the existence of the relat1onsh1p,
the next and equally important question, as Laskin J. stressed
in Can. Aero, 13 is the defmition of the scope of the duty.
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:rhe fiduciary duties of an errand boy are obviously not· as
mtense as those of a lawyer or a director of a corporation.
As Crawford points out in his Symposium paper14 the
most obvious starting point for this analysis is the ~ctual
undertaking of the fiduciary and the expectations of the other
party which flow therefrom.
There appear to be cases
how~ver, .wher~ Courts are reluctant to find that a fiduciary
relationship exists because of an assumption that a broadlybased duty t~ account for profits will necessarily accompany it.
Arguably, Midcon Oil 8 Gas Ltd. v. New British Dominion Oil
Co., 15 discusse~ by Goldenberg in bis Symposium paper, 16 is a
case of that kmd. In that case, two companies developed a
natural gas field as a joint venture, one of the companies
~urning respo~sibility for operating the field.
In order to
improve marketmg prospects, the operator promoted a company
to manufacture chemical fertilizers which would become a major
consumer of the natural gas. The inactive partner sought onehalf of the operator's share of the fertilizer company on the
ground that the operator had exploited its fiduciary position to
profit from promotion of the fertilizer business. A majority of
the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the claim on the
ground that p.o fiduciary obliga~ion ~xiste?. Rand J. dissented
on the basis tl~at t.he relationship did have a fiduciary
character. On this point, surely, Rand J. had the better side
of the argument.
Reasonable jurists could no doubt differ
however, on the more difficult joint as to whether the fiduciary
duty thereby created extende to embrace an opportunity of
the kind exploited by the defendant.
. ~ summary, then~ it .is in ~he nature of the fiduciary
obligation concept that it will continue to find new application
in novel factual situations.
Further, to the extent that its
app~tite for novel application is a source of anxiety, the
anxiety may be reduced by keeping clearly in mind the point
that the definition of the scope of the duty is a separate
exercise which should provide a check on over-breadth of
application of the concept.

Testing the Limits of Fiduciary Obligation
If in general terms, then, the remarkable frequency of
fiduciary analysis in the law reports in recent years ought not
to b.e a source of c?ncern, it is nonetheless my impression from
reading the Symposmm papers that the concept is indeed being
overworked to some extent in the recent case law. Fiduciary
obligation may well be being asked to do too much in the
~ense that it is ~eing utilized to analyze situations for which it
is not well smted.
A number of the factual situations
described in the various papers appear to me to be much more
amenable to analysis in contract or as breach of confidence or
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negligence cases in tort.
A partial explanation for this phenomenon would appear
to be that fiduciary obligation is being used as a device to fill
in gaps or remedy deficiencies in these other areas of the law.
In the cases discussed by Roebuck, 17 for example, there appear
to be two traditional rules with which the Courts are no longer
completely satisfied. The "customer list" rule is now evidently
thought to be too narrow a constraint on competition by
former emrloyees, at least as far as senior employees are
concerned. 1 Secondly, the rule that ineffective, non-competition
clauses are struck down in their entirety appears to be
considered unattractive. 19 In each case, we now have cases
imposing fiduciary obligations in such fashion as to undermine
or do an "end run" around these traditional rules. If reform is
desirable and it may well be, it would surely be preferable to
confront 'more directly the policy considerations underlying the
traditional rules.
Similarly, the law of contract has ha~ so~e difficulty. in
dealing effectively with pre:-contractual s1tuat10,n~·
Unlike
American law, Anglo-Canadian law has trad1t1onally not
recognized a duty to bargain in good faith. 20 In at least one
recent case 21 such a duty was in fact imposed on the
somewhat doubtful theory that a fiduciary relationship was in
place prior to the enteriD;g into of a <:ontract of employ~ez:it.
The theory is doubtful m~mu~h as it ~ee~ very. art1fic1al
indeed to construe the relat10nsh1p of negot1atmg parties as one
in which one party is in fact acting on behalf of the other. In
another case dealing with a pre-contractual situation, 22 an
Ontario Court imposed fiduciary obligations with respect to
confidential information disclosed in the context of such
negotiations. Again, leaving aside what . may arguably b~ tfie
rather special circumstances of that case, it seems very art1fic1al
to construe negotiating parties as having such a relationship.
Accordingly, the misuse of confidential information in such a
context would seem much more suitably dealt with by the
emerging tort of breach of confidence. 23 The breach of
confidence liability requires no special relationship of a fiduci~y
character and is accordingly better suited to deal with
situations in which the parties may understandably believe
themselves to be dealing with each other at arm's length.
The application of the fiduciary concept to corporations
and partnerships gives rise to somewhat simila: concer~s. The
interesting issue raised in two recent cases discussed m the~e
papers one relating to a law firm and the other to a bank, is
wheth~r the firm or bank will be liable for breach of a
fiduciary duty where the breach rests on the conduct of a
natural person who was unaware of the relationship developed
by another natural person employed by that firm or bank.
The question in such cases is whether, even though neither of
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the natural persons may be in breach of a fiduciary obligation,
the corporation or firm is liable on the view that the combined
knowledge and combined conduct of the two natural persons
constitutes a failure to act in a manner consistent with a
fiduciary obligation of the corporation or firm to its customer
or client. In Davey v. Woolley, Hames, Dale 8 Dingwal l, 24
the Ontario Court of Appeal clearly indicated that it would not
permit law firms to suffer schizophrenia, that the firm itself
would be saddled with the collective knowledge and actions of
individual members of the firm. This result seems particularly
defensible in the context of law firms where the potential for
divided loyalties is a well understood problem and something
which firms typically attempt to prevent through a number of
administrative means, as well they should. On the other hand,
the Standard Investments Ltd. v. C.I.B.C. 25 case, discussed by
Crawford 26 , suggests that an approach of this kind may very
considerably
complicate life for a
large, bureaucratic
organization such as a bank.
In Standard Investments, the
Ontario Court of Appeal imposed liability on the bank on the
theory that the two natural persons in question were both of
sufficient status, Harrison being the bank's Chairman and
Wadsworth its Chief Executive Officer, to constitute "directing
minds and wills" of the bank and that the bank would be
presumed to act as a fiduciary and would have attributed to it
the cumulative knowledge and actions of the two individuals.
The facts of the Standard Investments case are rather
unusual inasmuch as two very senior individuals, both active in
the same area of corporate responsibility, had apparently failed
to discuss their respective involvements in the related and very
important transactions which were held to cumulatively amount
to a breach of the bank's fiduciary obligation to the plaintiffs.
One wonders, however, whether fiduciary analysis would fit so
appropriately into these fact situations if the officials in
question had less proximity and less reason to be knowledgeable
of each other's actions than in this case. If neither of the
natural persons involved had any reason to believe themselves
to be in breach of fiduciary duties, it can at least be said that
the application of the rule will be surprising to the individuals
involved and will operate very differently than it does in its
traditional context.
Indeed, if Mr. Wadsworth has done
nothing that would lead us to describe him as a faithless
fiduciary, one wonders whether we have adopted the right
analytical model when we implicate him in a breach of
fiduciary duty to the bank's client. To be sure, the test for
breach of fiduciary obligation should be objective rather than
subjective. Further, there is a persistent line of analysis in the
fiduciary case law arguing for a strict standard of liability
either because of the need for deterrence or because of the
evidentiary difficulties encountered in establishing breach of
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fiduciary obligation. 27 Nonetheless, fiduciary analysis is in its
least persuasive role when it imposes liabilities that individuals
acting in good faith had no reason to anticipate.
Again, would it not be possible to analyze this type of
fact situation in contract or tort? What kind of advice did
the bank, through the actions of Mr. Wadsworth, contract to
provide to the plaintiffs?
Was that advice rendered with
sufficient skill and care? Perhaps it was not, but if it was so
rendered, we may wonder whether the liability imposed on the
bank is appropriate inasmuch as it appears to reflect a general
policy that banks ought not to provide financial and other
forms of support to two different clients who are engaged in a
competitive bidding exercise.
It may be desirable to impose
duties on banks, similar to those shouldered by law firms, not
to "act" on both sides of a transaction, but this is an issue
wotthy of more discussion than it has received in this case.
Further, it is not obvious that the usual remedies for
breach of fiduciary duty would fit appropriately into this
context.
In fact, the P.laintiff recovered only its lost
investment.
However, if the situation is accurately
characterized as one of breach of fiduciary obligation, it may be
asked whether the bank should have been required to disclose
its "ill-gotten" gains. Should Mr. Black, a director of the bank
- assuming he had known of or assisted in the breach - have
had to disgorge his profit as the successful purchaser of Crown
Trust? Certainll, these outcomes are arguable on traditional
fiduciary theory. 2
The migration of fiduciary duties of this kind into the
functioning of large, financial intermediaries, particularly as we
approach the possibility of greater integration in this sector of
the economy, appears to be a potential source of excitement in
the law reports.
As Crawford points out, 29 it is not at all
obvious that the highest of so-called Chinese walls could solve
the Standard Investments ~roblem.
On the other hand, as
Professor Ziegel has argued, 0 a careful reading of the Standard
Investments case itself suggests that the Ontario Court of
Appeal has left open the possibility that a Chinese wall defence
may be available on appropriate facts.
Another situation in which liabilities have been imposed
on parties acting in good faith and on the assumption that
they are not in breach of fiduciary duties arises in the context
of duties imposed on strangers to the fiduciary relationship.
Crawford31 provides us with the example of the recent
imposition of the constructive trust remedy on banks who
follow instructions from faithless fiduciaries by, for example,
honouring a cheque drawn on a trust account. There has been
some suggestion in the English case law32 that the receiving
bank may be saddled with constructive notice of the fiduciary's
breach of duty and be required to account for the money

The Recent Expansion of Fiduciary Obligation

309

disbursed, even though the bank may not have benefited in any
meaningful sense from the transaction.
Crawford's lack of
enthusiasm for the imposition of such liabilities33 is mirrored in
more recent English case law 34 and it is difficult to resist his
conclusion that the broad scope of the duty imposed on a bank
to make inquiries in suspicious circumstances suggested in these
cases is better defined by the law of negligence. There is no
suggestion in these cases that the bank is itself a fiduciary, of
course, but again, obligations to account that may be very
difficult for the ordinary person acting in good faith to
anticipate are imposed on grounds of breach of trust.
In summary, then, there appear to be a number of
situations in which fiduciary obligation analysis has supplanted
more familiar doctrines of contract and tort and, in my view at
least, it is not always apparent that clarity of analysis has
Further, it appears that
been fostered by this development.
fiduciary obligation is being used to some extent as a
surreptitious device for correcting and reforming existing
doctrine. While one would not wish to be seen to stand in the
way of progressive evolution of common law doctrine, one may
also ask whether a more direct attack on the deficiencies of
existing doctrine might be a more satisfactory manner of
accomplishing this objective.

Remedial Issues
A second major reason underlying the remarkable growth
of the fiduciary concept relates to remedial issues. A number
of remedial advantages flow from application of fiduciary
analysis, the most important of which, of course, is that the
constructive trust remedy, when available, holds forth the
possibility of proprietary relief. 35 This is coupled with the fact,
referred to by Crawford,36 that English jurisprudence has to
some extent purported to link the constructive trust exclusively
with fiduciary obligation. 37 This, in a case where proprietary
relief is, for some reason, a particularly desirable solution to
the problem at hand, there will be an understandable
temptation to "find" that the relationship between the parties
is of a fiduciary character.
Perhaps the best, recent, English illustration of this
creation of what might be referred to as "instant fiduciaries" is
to be found in Chase-Manhattan Bank v. Israel-British Bank. 38
In that case, the plaintiff mistakenly paid the defendant for a
second time an amount in excess of $2,000,000 U.S., not
realizing that the payment had already been made.
Shortly
thereafter, the defendant became insolvent and it was suggested
that the plaintiff should rank with all of the other unsecured
creditors.
Although there is obviously little or no basis on
such facts to find the existence of a fiduciary relationship of
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the traditional kind, Goulding J. held that the defendant bank
held the second payment as a fiduciary on the terms of a
constructive trust and accordingly, the plaintiff was allowed to
lift the second payment out of the insolvent's estate. Under
traditional analysis, it seems rather likely that the plaintiff
would have been left to the in personam claim historically
available in quasi-contract (or, in the modern terminologv~
restitution) to recover moneys paid under a mistake of fact. 3 !1
The obvious unfairness in subjecting the plaintifPs second
payment to the rigours of the insolvency inspired a rather
expanded notion of the nature of fiduciary obligation.
As expert testimony in Chase-Manhattan itself indicated,
American law is in this respect very different from English law.
The American view, well reflected in the Restatement of
Restitution, 40 is that the constructive trust is merely a remedy
available in cases of "unjust· enrichment" which is not at all
restricted to cases of fiduciary obligation. Thus, in American
law, there would be no reason why a thief could not be held to
hold stolen property as a constructive trustee, even though
there would be no basis whatsoever for suggesting the existence
of a fiduciary relationship and American authority so holds. 41
It is Crawford's view42 that this restricted aspect of
English law, whatever its current status in England, has never
been a part of Canadian law on this point. What is in any
event certainly beyond doubt is that The Supreme Court of
Canada in Pett/ms v. Becker43 explicitly adopted the American
theory of constructive trust and made the remedy available in
circumstances in which no suggestion of fiduciary obligation was
present. Accordingly, there is now plainly no need to invent
"instant fiduciaries" in order to make the constructive trust
remedy available and accordingly, one hopes that this particular
source of pressure on the growth of fiduciary obligation will
dissipate.
Indeed, the adoption of the American or unjust
enrichment theory of constructive trust in Pettkus should
facilitate a more far-reaching reassessment of the equitable
remedies available in restitutionary contexts, including the
fiduciary context. For example, once one accepts the view that
constructive trust is merely a proprietary remedy available in
some restitution cases, one is led to consider what kinds of
circumstances might suggest that proprietary relief is a more
suitable remedy than in personam relief.
In the fiduciary
context for example, the old learning from Lister 8 Co. v.
Stubbs4 4 is that a distinction is to be drawn between bribes
and other kinds of property acquired by fiduciaries and that
proprietary relief should not be available with respect to the
former. Although the employee accepting bribes is subject to
an accounting for their value to his employer, the Court
reasoned that the bribes were not accepted by the employee as
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an agent for the employer and accordingly, proprietary relief
would not be available. This line of reasoning leads to the
anomalous result that the remedies available against an
employee accepting bribes in breach of fiduciary obligation are
less vigorous than those available in other cases of default.
The unjust enrichment explanation of constructive trust makes
it quite unnecessary to find that ill-gotten gains were acquired
"on behalf of" the principal in the Lister v. Stubbs sense and
provides a basis for its overruling.
If Pettkus v. Becker provides us with a basis for
reconsidering Lister v. Stubbs, it may also serve as a foundation
for a more comprehensive review of the relationship between
proprietary and in personam relief in the law of restitution.
This is a subject for a larger paper, but in the present context
it may at least be noted that the Chase-Manhattan Bank case
itself suggests one potentially fruitful idea. Proprietary relief
would seem to be particularly appropriate in situations in
which the plaintiff is, as in that case, an involuntary creditor.
The use of constructive trust in the fiduciary context to strip
the faithless fiduciary of all profits generated by him is also
suggestive of a broader principle. The trust remedy provides a
disincentive for conduct viewed as particularly wrongful. To
the extent that the general question of the relationship of the
two different kinds of remedies is provoked by Pettkus, this
may well have implications for the use of the constructive trust
and accounting remedies in the fiduciary context.
It seems likely that greater familiarity with the use of
equitable proprietary relief in the fiduciary context and
elsewhere will also lead to some reshaping of the equitable
tracing rules.
As Jessel M.R.
pointed out in Re Hallett's
Estate; Knatchbull v. Hallett, 45 "· •• the moment you establish
the fiduciary relation, the modern rules of Equity, as regards
following trust money, apply." Again, this is a subject for a
much larger paper, but it will be recalled in general terms that
common law tracing rules rest on a rather physical conception
of the notion of property. 46 That is to say, common law would
incline to the tracing of physical assets, be they goods or
banknotes as long as they, or a substitute for the original
thing, could still be seen and identified. Thus, it is generally
believed, although the point remains a contentious one, that
one cannot trace at common law moneys which have been paid
into a bank account and mixed with other moneys. 47 Equity,
on the other hand, clearly permitted tracing into mixed funds
whether the mixture resulted from the fiduciary mixing his own
money with that of the plaintiff or mixing the money of a
number of innocent beneficiaries in the same account. Equity
established a set of presumptions to untangle such mixtures.
The most notorious of these is the so-called rule in Clayton's
Case48 which provides that in the case of a mixed account
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from which a series of disbursements has been made, the
burden of the disbursements will be allocated to the various
beneficiaries on a "first in, first out" basis.
Many have
observed and remarked upon the randomness and arbitrariness
of the results achieved in this fashion. 49 Accordingly, a recent
decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in O.S.C. v. Greymac
Credit Corp. 50 in which the Court held that it would not apply
the rule is very much to be welcomed.
In an elegant and
learned opinion, Morden J .A. adopted an approach which would
visit the various depredations made on the fund on a pro-rata
basis to the beneficiaries, calculated on the basis of their
respective contributions.
Hopefully, the shift in Canadian
jurisprudence away from the English model to the unjust
enrichment model will facilitate a rethinking of this area more
generally.
Finally, I note that there have been one or two
suggestions in the recent case law to the general effect that
damages may be an appropriate remedy in the context of
fiduciary obligation. In Szarfer v. Chodos, 51 for example, the
plaintiff client was held entitled to recover special and general
damages flowing from the adulterous affair the defendant lawyer
conducted with the plaintiffs wife, in breach of his fiduciary
obligations to the plaintiff.
Although there is more ancient
support for the notion of damages as a remedy for fiduciary
duty, 52 they do not appear to have been awarded with any
frequency.
Presumably, this is because in many cases where
compensation for loss appears appropriate, damages in tort or
contract would be an available alternative. If damages in the
sense of compensation for consequential loss are to be
considered a readily available remedy for breach of fiduciary
duty, this would represent a substantial change in fiduciary law
and should, I would suggest, involve us in some rethinking of
the nature of fiduciary obligation. At the present time, the
nature of the duty is essentially one requiring the defendant
not to profit from breaches of fiduciary duty. To hold that
the fiduciary is also liable for all of the consequential damages
that may flow from his failure to perform the fiduciary
obligation is, in effect, to convert fiduciary obligation into a
contractual undertaking to provide faithful fiduciary service.
Perhaps it would conduce to clearer thinking to restrict this
development to situations where such contractual arrangements
are clearly present in the actual relationship of the parties.
For present purposes, however, and without any intention of
trying to discourage creative evolution of fiduciary doctrine, it
is sufficient to note that a shift to damages liability would
involve a significant change in the remedial consequences of
breach of duty and this should, in turn, lead us to give careful
It is one
consideration to the nature of the duty imposed.
thing to insist that ill-gotten gains be disgorged or accounted
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for, quite another to hold that the defendant is responsible for
all consequential loss flowing from a breach of duty. We set
very high standards for fiduciaries. While such standards may
be appropriate where the liability is profit recovery, they may
not be if liability for consequential loss is to be imposed. At
the very least, it would seem that some breaches of fiduciary
duty should not have this consequence.
In short, broad
acceptance of a damages remedy should, in my view, rest upon
some fundamental rethinking about the nature of fiduciary
obligation.
In summary, then, the remarkable growth of fiduciary
doctrine reported on in these papers seems consistent with its
historical tradition and its open-textured structure. As Arnup
J.A. said in Laskin v. Bache and Co., 53 " • • • the category of
cases in which fiduciary duties and obligations arise . . . is no
more 'closed' than the categories of negligence at common law."
No doubt, it is realistic to expect that both fiduciary obligation
and negligence will expand to cove+ new types of commercial
and other activity in years to come~ My own wishful thinking
with respect to fiduciary obligation is that it would conduce to
clear thinking if fiduciary obligation were restricted to
relationships of the traditional fiduciary character, rather than
have the concept expand essentially in order to solve problems
that might be more straightforwardly addressed by revision to
the law of contract or the law of tort. Further, I very much
hope that the adoption of the American view of constructive
trust in Pettkus v. Beclcer54 will be seen to provide an
appropriate basis for reconsiderin~ a number of remedial issues
relating both to fiduciary obligation and to the law of
restitution more generally. A review of Canadian case law on
these subjects suggests that this is a problem that our Courts
are well equipped to tackle.
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